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RULE 60(B)(6):
WHETHER "TAPPING THE GRAND RESERVOIR
OF EQUITABLE POWER" IS APPROPRIATE TO
RIGHT AN ATTORNEY'S WRONG
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Pine Barrens episode from season three of The Sopranos,
Tony, the boss, sends out his agent Paulie to collect a debt. What should
have been a routine collection job goes awry, with Paulie forced to take
the debtor, who he believes is dead, out to the remote Pine Barrens area
of New Jersey. A number of miscues and one live debtor later, the
scenario effectively ends with Paulie shooting at the debtor, who runs
off and may or may not be dead.
Upset with Paulie's mishandling of the job, Tony tells Paulie that if
the problem resurfaces, he will have to deal with it. While Tony was the
boss and the money was his to collect, Paulie was entrusted with the job
and was rightly made responsible for his actions. An analogous
situation can occur when a client entrusts his attorney to litigate a case
properly. What happens when, like Paulie, an attorney mishandles a
case to such a degree that a dismissal or default judgment is entered
against the client? While the client, like Tony, freely chose who would
represent him, should the client be punished for the attorney's
wrongdoing?
This question can be of vital importance for federal courts when
faced with a litigant's motion for relief from a prior judgment pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). When a litigant suffers an
adverse judgment solely because of his attorney's misconduct, an issue
arises with respect to how the courts should allow the litigant to
proceed: by granting relief from the prior judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6) or steering the litigant toward a malpractice suit against the
attorney. The federal circuits are split on their answer to this question.
This Comment will first attempt to provide background on Rule
60(b), and more specifically, Rule 60(b)(6). Part III will explore five
cases that represent the current split among the federal circuits. Finally,
Part IV, through examining the major arguments on both sides of the
issue, will attempt to suggest the proper application of Rule 60(b)(6)
relief. This Comment is primarily focused on whether an attorney's
misconduct is a proper basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief-the thesis of this
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Comment is that an attorney's misconduct should qualify under Rule
60(b)(6).
II. RULE 60(B): BACKGROUND
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),' first adopted in 1937,
empowers a court in certain situations to relieve a party from a previous
judgment or order.2 To qualify for Rule 60(b) relief, the movant must
fall under one of the six specified categories3 and move for such relief
within a reasonable time.' The text of the rule provides that relief is
appropriate on the basis of:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment!
Rule 60(b) empowers a court, when one of the above bases has been
satisfied, to exercise its considerable discretion to counteract injustice.6
In doing so, a court must balance competing judicial interests.7 For
example, in deciding when relief is appropriate, a court must balance
such competing concerns as a preference for cases being adjudicated on
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. On the timing of a Rule 60(b) motion, the text states that "[t]he motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Id.; see also LARRY L. TEPLY &
RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 941 (3d ed. 2004); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 707 (6th ed. 2002). While what constitutes a
"reasonable time," particularly for the subsections not subject to the one-year time limit, is an
important topic worthy of its own discussion, it is outside the scope of this Comment.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
6. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 4, at 707-08.
7. Brett Warren Weathersbee, Note, No More Excuses: Refusing to Condone Mere
Carelessness or Negligence Under the "Excusable Neglect" Standard in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(1), 50 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (1997) [hereinafter Weathersbee Note].
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the merits and trial judges having access to meaningful sanctions in
order to move litigation along expeditiously.8 While the drafters of Rule
60(b) may have felt they struck the proper balance between the
competing concerns, the rule nonetheless offers little guidance as to how
it should be applied.9 Because "[n]o consistent pattern or specific set of
facts govern application of the Rule,"' lack of uniformity in application
of the rule among the circuits is not wholly unexpected.
Rule 60(b)(6) is the most textually enigmatic of the six reasons for
relief contained in Rule 60(b). The text of Rule 60(b)(6) merely
provides for relief when "any other reason justif[ies] relief from the
operation of the judgment."" Rule 60(b)(6) is frequently referred to as
a catch-all provision." Indeed, it should not be entirely surprising that
this provision was the most controversial at the time of its adoption-
the natural fear being that the provision would grant courts limitless
discretion." A number of courts have aptly described the catch-all
provision as "a 'grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a
particular case......
8. Susan Marie Lapenta, Note, Inryco, Inc. v. Metropolitan Engineering Co.: Inexcusable
Neglect by Whom?, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 695, 704 (1984). As this Comment will attempt to
demonstrate, any court making a determination on Rule 60(b) relief could potentially
encounter any number of competing interests. Professor Mary Kay Kane, for example,
argued that the question of relief from a civil judgment has been difficult since the beginning
of the court system because it forces a court to balance the need for finality against the desire
to find truth and render justice. Mary Kay Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass
Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 41, 41 (1978). Professor Kane further explained that
the American legal system, as evidenced by the expansion of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, ordinarily places finality before truth. Id. at 41-42.
9. See Weathersbee Note, supra note 7, at 1623.
10. Mary C. Cavanagh, Note, Interpreting Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Limitations on Relief from Judgments for "Any Other Reason," 7 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 127, 137 (2002) [hereinafter Cavanagh Note].
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). The other, of course, refers to reasons other than the first
five listed by Rule 60(b). In fact, the grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief are distinct from the
grounds for the first five provisions; by definition, a set of circumstances qualifying for, say,
the excusable neglect provision of Rule 60(b)(1) could not qualify for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.48[2] (3d ed. 2004); Darden
v. Dandridge, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12667, at *6 (D. D.C. June 13, 1991). To read Rule
60(b)(6) as not being distinct would dramatically undercut the efficacy of the first five. See
MOORE, supra, $ 60.48[2]. As one court succinctly stated, "clause (6) may not be used as a
vehicle for circumventing clauses (1) through (5)." Id. at n.5 (citations omitted).
12. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 11, T 60.48[1].
13. See Kane, supra note 8, at 43, Certainly such an argument could be made from a
plain reading of the text. In practice, however, as I discuss infra, the rule has been anything
but limitless.
14. MOORE, supra note 11, 60.48[1] (citations omitted).
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Despite this extensive power, courts are not free to dispense Rule
60(b)(6) relief in any circumstance." Generally, relief is limited to
"extraordinary circumstances."' 6  In Community Dental Services v.
Tani,7 for example, the court explained that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is
appropriate when the movant establishes "'extraordinary circumstances
which prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute [his case].' ' .8
However, courts fail to agree on what circumstances are exceptional. 9
Furthermore, courts also fail to agree on the proper test to be applied.'
Whether an attorney's gross negligence is a proper basis for Rule
60(b)(6) is one such situation where courts have been unable to agree.
A simple example illustrates the manner in which Rule 60(b)(6) can
function in the context of an attorney's gross negligence. A, driving
home from work, is struck by B, who ran a red light. A retains an
attorney and suit is filed in federal court.2' During discovery, A's
attorney disobeys several court orders. The trial court then dismisses
the suit as a sanction for A's attorney disobeying the orders. First, A
will likely want to obtain new counsel. Second, A and his new attorney
must decide whether to progress by filing a malpractice action against
the former attorney or by attempting to have the original suit tried on
the merits. If choosing the latter, A and his attorney will need to move
to have the dismissal vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). A would claim
that the dismissal ought to be vacated because the former attorney was
grossly negligent in handling the case.
This Comment will attempt to answer the question of whether courts
should allow A to pursue his rights through the original action or
through a malpractice action against the original attorney. The
15. Id. (explaining that Rule 60(b)(6) "does not really provide a court with unfettered
discretion to set aside a judgment in all cases").
16. Id.
17. 282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002).
18. Id. at 1168 (quoting Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729, 730
(9th Cir. 1971)) (per curiam) (alteration in original).
19. See Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169 (highlighting the split among circuits concerning whether
Rule 60(b)(6) relief is properly applied in situations of attorney gross negligence).
20. Compare United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St., 125 F.3d 1076, 1083 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted) ("requiring that the movant show: (1) good cause for the default; (2) quick
action to correct the default; and (3) the existence of a meritorious defense to the original
action"), with Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168 (citations omitted) (explaining that a party merits Rule
60(b)(6) relief if demonstrating that extraordinary circumstances prevented the proper
prosecution or defense of the action).
21. While the above hypothetical likely does not lend itself to proper federal subject
matter jurisdiction, the assumption, for the sake of simplicity, is that such jurisdiction is
proper.
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following two sections of this Comment will trace and examine the
underlying cases and justifications on both sides in an attempt to suggest
which approach is correct.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The federal circuits diverge on whether an attorney's gross
negligence provides a basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.22 For example, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that attorney conduct must
always impute the client, but, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that, under the right circumstances, attorney gross negligence could
warrant a default judgment to be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).23
This section will discuss the important cases that constitute the circuit
split, highlighting as well the reasoning employed on both sides of the
issue.
A. Link v. Wabash Railroad
Although dealing with principles of agency law rather than
specifically Rule 60(b), Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.24 is a Supreme
Court case standing generally for the proposition that clients should be
tied to the acts of their freely chosen attorneys.25 In Link, the Court
heard a case in which the district court dismissed with prejudice the
plaintiff's suit after his attorney failed to appear at a pretrial
conference.26 In affirming the dismissal, the Court disagreed with the
contention that the plaintiff was being unjustly penalized for his
attorney's actions.2' The plaintiff freely chose his representative in the
22. Compare United States v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632, 634-35 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that attorney conduct, whether willful, negligent, or grossly negligent, must be
imputed to his client), with Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169 (holding that attorney gross negligence may
serve as the basis for setting aside a default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)). Other
commentators, of course, have acknowledged that the courts have failed to reach a consensus
on this issue. See, e.g., Cavanagh Note, supra note 10, at 134 (explaining, in the Rule 60(b)(6)
context, that "[a]ttorney misconduct or negligence is another factual situation where judicial
decisions conflict").
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
24. 370 U.S. 626 (1961).
25. See id. at 633-34; see also Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168; 7108 W. Grand, 15 F.3d at 634;
Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir. 1986).
26. 370 U.S. at 628-29. In deciding to dismiss the suit, the Court considered the "drawn-
out history of the litigation" and the fact that the attorney failed to provide a reasonable
explanation for his absence. Id. at 628-29, 633. However, the plaintiff's attorney had called
the clerk of the district court and the trial judge's secretary in an effort to have the
conference, which he could not attend, delayed. Id. at 642 (Black, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 633-34. This notion that the client is not being unjustly punished even though
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suit, the Court opined, and therefore must accept the outcome of that
choice. 8
As stated above, Link did not expressly deal with Rule 60(b), but the
Court's opinion did reference the rule. In discussing the petitioner's
situation, the Court twice noted that the petitioner failed to pursue the
potential escape hatch for the dismissal contained in Rule 60(b).29 Link
is frequently cited in discussions of whether an attorney's gross
negligence is proper grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief because for a court
to determine that such relief is proper, it must do so in a manner that is
consistent with the main principle from Link: that a client is responsible
for the actions of his freely chosen attorney.
B. United States v. 7108 West Grand Avenue
In United States v. 7108 West Grand Avenue,3 ° the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals heard a case in which a husband and wife-claimants
in the forfeiture proceeding-had three properties, purportedly
purchased with illegal drug revenue, that were seized by the
government.3 ' The claimants had an attorney who represented them in
the forfeiture proceedings, but this attorney failed to file a timely claim
for any of the three properties on behalf of the husband, and the
attorney filed a timely claim for only one of the properties on behalf of
the wife. 32 The government filed a motion for default judgment, which
the court granted after neither the attorney nor the wife appeared at the
motion hearing.3
The claimants retained different counsel after the default and filed a
motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b). 34 The claimants
the attorney is responsible for the misconduct is refuted, as will be discussed further infra, in
certain later cases. See, e.g., Shepard Claims Serv. Inc. v. William Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d
190, 195 (6th Cir. 1986) (displaying concern for the inequity of such a situation when stating
that "[a] default judgment deprives the client of his day in court, and should not be used...
for disciplining attorneys.... [W]e do not believe that this record exhibits circumstances in
which a client should suffer the ultimate sanction of losing his case without any consideration
of the merits").
28. Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34.
29. See id. at 632, 635-36. The Court, for example, explained that it need not "consider
whether the District Court would have... abus[ed] its discretion had it rejected a motion
under Rule 60(b)." Id. at 635.
30. 15 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1994).
31. Id. at 634. While the husband was in prison on federal drug charges, his wife was
not. Id. at 633.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Interestingly, the court's opinion never specified which specific portion of Rule
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maintained that their former attorney was grossly negligent in the
handling of their case, meriting relief under the rule.35
Citing Link, among other authorities, the court held that all attorney
conduct is imputed to the client.36 In reaching this'conclusion, the court
reasoned that both the negligent and willful acts of an attorney normally
impute the client.37 Therefore, the court reasoned it would be illogical to
treat gross negligence, which falls in between negligent and willful
conduct, differently than the two extremes." In addition, the court
stated that if clients were insulated from the neglect of their attorneys,
"neglect would become all too common" due to neither party being
ultimately held responsible.39
C. United States v. 8136 South Dobson Street
In United States v. 8136 South Dobson Street,4" the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals faced a claimant who, like the claimants in 7108 West
Grand, was subject to forfeiture proceedings on property purportedly
acquired with illegal drug revenue." After receiving two default
judgments and two summary judgments against his properties due in
part to poor legal representation," the defendant retained a new
60(b) the claimants sought to invoke for relief. However, it would appear that they sought
relief pursuant to, and the court's analysis took place under, Rule 60(b)(6). Indeed, in a very
similar fact situation from the later case of United States v. 8136 South Dobson Street, the
Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized that relief in such a situation would be granted pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6). See infra Part III.C.
35. 7108 W. Grand, 15 F.3d at 633-34.
36. Id. at 634-35.
37. Id. at 634.
38. Id. To further illustrate this point, the court drew an analogy to a hospital's tort
liability. Id. Certainly, the court speculated, no lawyer would contend that a hospital, though
responsible for the negligence and intentional conduct of its employees, is not responsible for
gross negligence. Id.
39. Id. (citations omitted). Under closer scrutiny, this argument is not entirely
convincing. The subtext of the court's concern appears to be that clients and attorneys could
somehow manage to neglect certain parts of the litigation when such a strategy becomes
advantageous. Courts, though, generally consider the entire context of a case when deciding
the merits of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See generally Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d
1164 (9th Cir. 2002); Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1986); Darden
v. Dandridge, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12667 (D. D.C. June 13, 1991). For neglect to indeed
"become all too common," the courts would likely have to cease consideration of the case as a
whole.
40. 125 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 1997).
41. Id. at 1078. Rodney Anderson, the defendant, was in fact the subject of forfeiture
proceedings on three pieces of real estate and twelve vehicles. Id.
42. Anderson's attorney filed a number of claims in response to the forfeiture
proceedings on behalf of several of Anderson's family members, but not for Anderson
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attorney who motioned for relief from the judgments pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6). 43  The motion was premised on the belief that one of the
defendant's former attorneys handled the case with gross negligence and
willful misconduct." "
The court considered the merit of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion under
the following three-part test: "the movant must show (1) good cause for
the default; (2) quick action to correct the default; and (3) ... a
meritorious defense to the original action." While evaluating all three
portions of the test,46 the court also rejected the motion because,
pursuant to 7108 West Grand, a client is bound to all the actions of his
attorney.47 Additionally, the court reaffirmed the contention from 7108
West Grand that, though the client may deserve compensation for the
attorney's wrongdoings, the compensation ought to come from bringing
a malpractice suit against the attorney, not from prolonging litigation
against the nonmoving party.48
D. Community Dental Services v. Tani
In Community Dental Services v. Tani,49 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals heard a case in which a defendant had motioned for relief
under Rule 60(b)(6) in an attempt to reopen a default judgment entered
against him."0 The defendant's attorneys not only ignored multiple court
orders to serve opposing counsel with the answer, but they maintained
to their client throughout the litigation that the case was progressing
himself. Id. at 1078-79.
43. Id. at 1080.
44. Id. While addressing the merits of Anderson's Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the court was
not convinced that he truly was entitled to the relief because none of his original attorneys
filed a claim on his behalf, which was necessary to establish him as a party. Id. at 1082-84.
Nevertheless, the court considered the merits under the assumption that Anderson was
eligible for Rule 60(b)(6) relief as the legal representative of his mother. Id. at 1083.
45. Id. (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 1083-87. The court concluded that Anderson's claim failed both the first and
third parts of the test. Id. at 1087.
47. Id. at 1084.
48. Id. (quoting United States v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 1994)).
As with the court in 7108 W. Grand, the court here made the argument that recourse in the
form of a malpractice suit against the attorney is preferred over drawing out the original
litigation. Id. Why? Clearly, the court is resting in part upon the notion that it is "unfair" to,
in a sense, punish the nonmoving party by reopening the original litigation. The original
party ostensibly did something to be named in the suit-drawing out the original litigation is
little more than trying the original suit on its merits.
49. 282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002).
50. Id. at 1166-67.
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well."
In determining the merits of the defendant's motion, the court
reasoned that a party is due Rule 60(b)(6) relief if he can establish
extraordinary circumstances preventing the proper litigation of the
case. 2 The district court did not believe the defendant's situation was
extraordinary because a client is normally considered to be "chargeable
with his counsel's conduct" and apprised of all facts known to his
attorney." Citing Link, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that an
attorney's negligence ought to be imputed to the client, but the court
held that a client who demonstrates that his attorney acted with gross
negligence is entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief. In reaching this
conclusion, the court stated that a trial on the merits should be favored
whenever possible over the extreme measure of default judgment.5 The
court also contended that "the judicial system loses credibility as well as
the appearance of fairness" if "an innocent party is forced to suffer
[such] drastic consequences. 5 6
E. Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Center
In Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,57 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals heard a case in which the plaintiff alleged racial
discrimination in the termination of his employment with the
defendant. The plaintiff's attorney failed to submit overdue answers to
interrogatories and failed to appear at a pretrial conference. 59 After the
plaintiff's attorney failed to comply with the court's discovery order, the
court dismissed the suit.60 Having dropped his derelict attorney, the
51. Id. Tani, in fact, maintained that he was not apprised of the state of his case until the
default order was mailed to his office. Id. at 1167. Ironically, the only reason Tani received
the default order in the mail was because Eugene Salmonsen, Tani's lead attorney, had
provided the court with Tani's office as his (Salmonsen's) address of record. Id.
52. Id. at 1168.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1168-69. The court contends that its holding need not conflict with the holding
in Link because the latter expressly declined to state whether the decision reached the
context of a Rule 60(b) motion. Id. at 1170. Link, the court stated, thus does not bar a
finding that gross negligence by a client's attorney may comprise extraordinary circumstances.
Id. (citing Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir. 1986) (distinguishing
Link upon the same grounds)).
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. 804 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1986).





61plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appealed the case.
In overturning the district court, the court of appeals held that,
rather than dismissing the case, sanctions should be imposed on the
attorney when the attorney acts inappropriately.' The court, in support
of this solution, stressed how potentially inadequate a malpractice suit
may be to the wronged client.' Not only might it prove difficult to
obtain and collect a judgment, but the perception of the judicial system
is compromised when the wrongdoing of a lawyer-an officer of the
court-prevents his client's case from being tried on the merits. 
4
Furthermore, the court believed that relying on malpractice suits "would
only multiply, rather than dispose of litigation." 65  In addition,
malpractice suits may not deter as effectively as sanctions because the
attorney likely would not be punished until after a lengthy suit.
66
IV. ANALYSIS
Should courts consider an attorney's gross negligence in handling his
client's case to be appropriate grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief? Yes, for
reasons discussed below, the appropriate stance is for courts to
recognize attorney gross negligence as a valid basis for relief. First, this
Part will outline and comment upon the different justifications advanced
on both sides of the issue. Second, this Part will conclude with a
suggestion for which Rule 60(b)(6) scheme should be employed.
A. The Arguments For and Against
1. Judicial Efficiency
Undoubtedly, courts require the power to dismiss suits with
prejudice in order to police the crowded dockets.67 As stated in Link,
courts require this power "to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." '  While Link
61. The plaintiff had apparently paid a $400 fee to his former attorney, but was unable to
afford a different attorney. Id.
62. Id. at 808.
63. Id. This argument would appear to be particularly strong when, as was the case here,
the plaintiff did not have the financial wherewithal to hire another attorney.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3d Cir. 1984)).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962).
68. Id. at 630-31.
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specifically dealt with dismissal for want of prosecution, 69 the Court's
concerns of judicial efficiency are analogous to concerns present in a
Rule 60(b)(6) motion. ° Acknowledging that courts need effective
means to move litigation along expeditiously, is dismissing a case
because of attorney wrongdoing an effective tool? By dismissing the
original litigation, the court has handled that matter as expeditiously as
possible. However, if the larger goal of the court is to manage the
overall caseload, dismissing the original litigation due to attorney
wrongdoing may not be the best option. As the court in Einstein
Medical pointed out, such a dismissal actually increases the burden on
crowded dockets by multiplying litigation.7'
Although the Einstein Medical court did not include analysis with
this contention, 7 a brief look at our hypothetical personal-injury suit will
illustrate its validity. Remember, A filed suit against B over a traffic
accident involving both parties. A's original attorney caused the case to
be dismissed by disobeying court orders. If the court could penalize the
attorney without dismissal, then the case could simply move forward
and be tried on its merits.73 On the other hand, if the court has
dismissed and will not vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6),
then A must seek compensation by a malpractice action against the
original attorney. This malpractice suit makes the total burden on the
courts greater because now an entirely new case must be fully litigated.
Thus, the court must oversee one entire suit-the malpractice action-
and part of another-the original suit-instead of merely the original
suit. In this way, judicial efficiency concerns are better served with
trying the original case on the merits through Rule 60(b)(6) relief, rather
than by relying on compensation through a malpractice action.
2. Malpractice Suits: The Proper Form of Redress?
Besides malpractice compensation actually increasing the burden on
the legal system,74 this approach is problematic in other ways. For
example, courts often fail to explore whether malpractice is a truly
69. See id. at 629.
70. After all, in both instances the court must deal with stalled litigation. The mode of
dilatory behavior may be different, but the strain on judicial resources is the same.
71. 804 F.2d at 808; see also Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir.
2002). Neither court, unfortunately, included its analysis in reaching this conclusion.
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
73. Courts frequently state the belief that a trial on the merits is always preferred over a
default judgment. See, e.g., Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170 (citations omitted).
74. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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adequate remedy for the client. In Tani, the court faced an excellent
example of a client for whom malpractice litigation was a poor option
for recourse.76 Because of a default judgment entered against him, the
defendant, a dentist, faced almost two million dollars in damages and a
permanent injunction against using a trademarked term in advertising
his practice." While the defendant would have recourse against his
original attorneys for their gross negligence,8  the interim period
between default judgment and possible recovery via malpractice could
spell financial ruin for the defendant and his family, as he would likely
struggle mightily to keep his business and home in face of the
judgment.79 Given the problems inherent in malpractice recovery, the
Tani court properly chose to vacate the default judgment pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(6) and continue with the original litigation.8°
Einstein Medical also illustrates a situation where malpractice
litigation was a poor form of redress. As stated above, the plaintiff in
Einstein Medical was forced to seek vacation of his default judgment pro
se because he could not afford to hire another attorney after he paid a
$400 fee to his derelict attorney.81 Litigants with limited financial means
are obviously disadvantaged because of the expense involved in
retaining new counsel to pursue a malpractice action; 2 a litigant can of
course proceed pro se, but the problems with this are obvious.
75. See generally United States v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St., 125 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 1997).
76. 282 F.3d at 1171-72.
77. Id. at 1166-67.
78. See id. at 1171.
79. See id. at 1171-72. Furthermore, the court pointed out that any possible malpractice
award "cannot restore retroactively the intangible business benefits that ensue from the
continued use of a name that has previously identified a business to the public." Id. at 1172.
80. See id.
81. Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 806 (3d Cir. 1986).
82. The possibility of retaining counsel on a contingent fee arrangement potentially
vitiates much of this concern. No provision of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct precludes a contingent fee arrangement from being used for a legal malpractice
action. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2004) (prohibiting the use of a
contingent fee arrangement in criminal defense and certain family law matters).
Nevertheless, a contingent fee arrangement is an imperfect solution, as a litigant faces the
very real possibility that he will not find an attorney willing to take the case. See GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 511-12 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining
that "contingency fee lawyers turn down as many cases as they accept"). The litigant in
Einstein Medical, for example, had to proceed pro se because he could not afford to hire a
second attorney. 804 F.2d at 806.
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3. The Prestige of the Judicial System
When considering a Rule 60(b) motion, courts are often concerned
with the impact the ruling will have on the public perception of the
judicial system.83 For example, in 7108 West Grand, the court stated that
an attorney's negligence and willful misconduct both impute the client;
therefore, the court noted, not holding that gross negligence is imputed
to the client, even though negligent and willful conduct are, "would
make hay for standup comics. '" 4 Leaving aside the court's perception of
suitable standup comedy material, it does make an intriguing point as to
the seeming incongruity such a ruling would create. Public perception
of the judicial system being diminished because of such a ruling,
however, may overstate the public's interest in the consistency of legal
reasoning.
Arguably of greater concern is the loss of prestige the judicial system
suffers when a client's suit is dismissed solely because of the attorney's
wrongdoing. 5 As the court in Einstein Medical pointed out, such a
dismissal reflects poorly upon the entire system because attorneys are
officers of the court.' To put it slightly differently, "[w]hen an attorney
is grossly negligent.., the judicial system loses credibility as well as the
appearance of fairness, if... an innocent party is forced to suffer drastic
consequences." s  Attorney gross negligence, considering notions of
judicial prestige, should be a valid basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
4. Judicial Preference for a Trial on the Merits
Courts frequently state that a trial on the merits is preferable to a
judgment by defaultY As frequently, they fail to explicitly state why this
is so." Certainly, part of why courts prefer a trial on the merits has to do
with concerns of judicial prestige discussed above.90 As stated, the
judicial system loses prestige when an innocent party is punished for the
acts of his or her representative. 9 In the same vein, the judicial system
loses prestige when the people it governs doubt its ability to adjudicate
83. See, e.g., United States v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1994);
Einstein Med., 804 F.2d at 808.
84. 15 F.3d at 634.
85. See Einstein Med., 804 F.2d at 808.
86. Id.
87. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170.
88. See, e.g., id. (citations omitted).
89. See, e.g., id.
90. See supra Part IV.A.3.
91. See supra Part IV.A.3.
2005] 1009
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
grievances. Without question, one of the most vital functions of our
judicial system is the normative role it plays; people pattern their
behavior, or so the theory goes, around the laws and judicial system of
our country. If people lose faith in the judicial system because
grievances are not properly settled, then the system loses some of its
normative power. The preference for a trial on the merits suggests that
attorney gross negligence ought to be a valid basis for Rule 60(b)(6)
relief.
B. The Proper Method of Rule 60(b)(6) Relief
Assuming that an attorney's gross negligence should be valid
grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, the question still remains of how a
court is best to evaluate and apply such relief. As discussed, courts have
formulated various tests for when Rule 60(b)(6) relief is appropriate.'
Clearly, Rule 60(b)(6) relief ought to be treated as "an extraordinary
remedy... [that] is granted only in exceptional circumstances. '" 93 After
all, if courts granted such relief freely, parties could potentially
circumvent the appeals process.94 Thus, a nonspecific standard ensuring
that relief is granted only to a truly deserving party is optimal.95 The
court in Tani properly required that a party seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief
display extraordinary circumstances preventing the proper litigation of
the case.96 Instead of a mechanical, multipart test,' this test allows the
court to consider the totality of the circumstances98 and make a proper
judgment as to whether relief is appropriate. In this way, not only is
justice most likely to be served, but improper application of the rule is
most likely to be avoided.
Even with such a test to determine that appropriate relief is
employed, there remains a valid concern that the misconduct of the
attorney unfairly burdens the opposing party by saddling him or her
92. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
93. United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St., 125 F.3d 1976, 1082 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Dickerson v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)).
94. MOORE, supra note 11, 91 60.481.
95. This contention fits well with one of the major themes of Justice Black's spirited
dissent in Link. In his dissent, Justice Black contended that the Court's rigid adherence to
agency principles results in the plaintiff being wronged. Link, 370 U.S. at 643-45 (Black, J.,
dissenting). For Justice Black, how the case transpired "is a good illustration of the
deplorable kind of injustice that can come from the acceptance of any such mechanical rule."
Id. at 645.
96. See supra Part III.D.
97. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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with extra costs associated with litigation prolonged
attorney's misconduct.99 In Einstein Medical, the court
this concern by ordering that the plaintiff's attorney
sanctioned, with her fine going directly to the opposing






For the foregoing reasons, relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) is the
proper court response when a client seeks relief from an adverse ruling
caused by a former attorney's gross negligence. There are four major
justifications advanced on both sides of the issue: concern for (1) judicial
efficiency; (2) malpractice suits; (3) judicial prestige; and (4) a trial on
the merits. Taking into account these four vital issues, courts ought to
uniformly recognize an attorney's gross negligence as a valid basis for
Rule 60(b)(6) relief. As the court in Tani stated, "relief under Rule
60(b)(6) may often constitute the only mechanism for affording a client
actual and full relief from his counsel's gross negligence-that is, the
opportunity to present his case on the merits."'0 2 The Sopranos had it
right: the person responsible for the wrongdoing should be the person
held directly accountable.
CHRISTOPHER G. MEADOWS
99. See Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 808 (3d Cir. 1986).
100. Id.
101. While reliance on a malpractice action would excuse the nonmoving party from
further litigation costs, the extra costs incurred by the nonmoving party while still in the suit
would not seemingly be reimbursed, unlike with the sanction scheme from Einstein Medical,
by a malpractice action.
102. Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002).
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